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The History and Future of Capital
Punishment in the United States

ROBERT A. STEIN*

It is a great pleasure to be with you today to deliver the 2016 Nathaniel
Nathanson Lecture. I am delighted to join the many distinguished jurists
and scholars that have delivered this Lecture in prior years. Early in his
career, Professor Nathanson clerked for Justice Louis Brandeis and served
the Securities and Exchange Commission in its formative days.1 Professor
Nathanson is deservedly viewed as one of the architects of modern
administrative law.2 His work, Administrative Discretion in the Interpretation
of Statutes, was monumental in the field of administrative law.3 Professor
Nathanson was the first scholar to identify a “principle of limited judicial
review” when reviewing agency interpretations of statutes.4 One year after
his death, the Supreme Court impliedly adopted Professor Nathanson’s
* © 2017 Robert A. Stein. Everett Fraser Professor of Law, Distinguished Global
Professor, University of Minnesota Law School. This Article was presented as the thirty-third
annual Nathaniel L. Nathanson Memorial Lecture at the University of San Diego School of
Law on September 28, 2016. I express my thanks to Dean Stephen C. Ferruolo, Professors John
H. Minan and Laurence Claus, and other faculty and community gathered for the lecture and
discussion. I also express my appreciation to two outstanding graduates of the University of
Minnesota Law School, Nicholas R. Bednar, a 2016 graduate, and Alysha Bohanon, a 2017
graduate, for their superb assistance in the preparation of this Article.
1. See Carl McGowan, In Memoriam: National L. Nathanson, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 913,
914 (1983).
2. See 32nd Nathaniel L. Nathanson Memorial Lecture, UNIV. OF SAN DIEGO, http://
www.sandiego.edu/law/school/events/detail.php?_focus=51509 [https://perma.cc/HT3ABQTY] (last visited Feb. 16, 2017).
3. See Nathaniel L. Nathanson, Administrative Discretion in the Interpretation of
Statutes, 3 VAND. L. REV. 470 (1950).
4. John H. Reese, Bursting the Chevron Bubble: Clarifying the Scope of Judicial
Review in Troubled Times, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1103, 1108 (2004).
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formulation in Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.5 Today,
Chevron is one of the most cited and studied Supreme Court cases in
history.6 Professor John H. Reese notes how “strikingly similar” the Nathanson
model is to the language of Chevron.7 Perhaps it is not much of a leap to
suggest that Justice John Paul Stevens, a student of Professor Nathanson
and author of the Court’s Chevron opinion, drew inspiration from his
distinguished professor.8
I learned a great deal about Professor Nathanson from our mutual friend,
Professor Carl Auerbach, my dear colleague at the University of Minnesota
Law School for many years before he taught at the University of San Diego
Law School. Carl Auerbach and Nathaniel Nathanson together represent two
giants of modern administrative law.
On October 20, 2015, I had the pleasure of hosting the late Justice
Antonin Scalia at the University of Minnesota for the annual Stein Lecture
series.9 Four months earlier, the Court in Glossip v. Gross upheld the use
of lethal injection under the Eighth Amendment.10 During our Conversation
I asked Justice Scalia about Justice Breyer’s dissent in Glossip, in which
Justice Breyer argued that capital punishment is unconstitutional under
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.11 Justice Scalia lamented that the
Court’s jurisprudence made it “practically impossible to impose” the death
penalty.12 Justice Scalia criticized Justice Breyer’s call for the abolition
of capital punishment due to its already-numerous exceptions, retorting,
“[y]ou did it, Steve!”13 Justice Scalia concluded by stating that he “wouldn’t
5. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984).
6. See Melina Forte, May Legislative History Be Considered at Chevron Step
One? The Third Circuit Dances the Chevron Two-Step in United States v. Geiser, 54 VILL.
L. REV. 727, 727 n.2 (2009).
7. Reese, supra note 4, at 1110.
8. Cf. Justice John Paul Stevens, Supreme Court of the United States, Byron White:
Hero and Scholar 1(Sept. 22, 2011), https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/speeches/JPS%20
University%20of%20Colorado%20Speech%2009.22.11.pdf [https://perma.cc/VC3E-MN2U]
(“Nathaniel Nathanson, my constitutional law professor [] taught me to be aware of ‘glittering
generalities.’”).
9. See The 2015 Stein Lecture: U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, UNIV.
MINN. L. SCH., https://www.law.umn.edu/events/2015-stein-lecture-us-supreme-court-justiceantonin-scalia [https://perma.cc/7VG7-7GK7] (last visited Feb. 16, 2017).
10. See Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2729 (2015).
11. Cf. id. at 2755 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating he “would ask for full briefing
on a more basic question: whether the death penalty violates the Constitution”).
12. Justice Antonin Scalia, The 2015 Stein Lecture at the University of Minnesota
(Oct. 20, 2016) [hereinafter The 2015 Stein Lecture]; see also Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S.
390, 428 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“If the system that has been in place for 200 years
(and remains widely approved) ‘shock[s]’ the dissenters’ consciences . . . perhaps they
should doubt the calibration of their consciences, or better still, the usefulness of ‘conscience
shocking’ as a legal test.”).
13. The 2015 Stein Lecture, supra note 12.
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be surprised” if the Court found the death penalty unconstitutional in the
near future.14 Justice Scalia’s statement drew national attention.15 Today’s
Lecture expands upon Justice Scalia’s remarks by reviewing the history of
capital punishment cases in the Supreme Court. I hope that by presenting
this history, I can shed some light on the future of capital punishment in
America.
As an originalist, Justice Scalia held the beliefs of the Founding Fathers
in high esteem when interpreting the Constitution.16 Justice Scalia noted
that the death penalty has been a part of the U.S. justice system since
its earliest days.17 Death penalty laws date as far back as the Code of
Hammurabi—written in the eighteenth century B.C.18 The first recorded
death sentence in the American Colonies occurred in 1608.19 Captain George
Kendall was executed by firing squad after accusations emerged that he
was a Spanish spy.20 Four years later, the Governor of Virginia enacted the
Divine, Moral, and Martial Laws, which provided the death penalty for the

14. Id.
15. See, e.g., Christian Farias, Justice Scalia Says He’ll Retire Once He ‘Can’t Do
the Job As Well,’ HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 21, 2015, 4:50 PM), http://www.huffington
post.com/entry/justice-scalia-retirement_us_5627ba31e4b08589ef4a1366 [https://perma.cc/
ECE6-4KJR] (“Scalia reprised comments from September, when he said it ‘wouldn’t surprise
me’ if the current court struck down the death penalty as unconstitutional.”); Justice
Scalia: “Wouldn’t Surprise Me” If Death Penalty Struck Down, CBS NEWS (Oct. 20, 2015,
9:31 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/justice-scalia-wouldnt-surprise-me-if-death-penaltystruck-down [https://perma.cc/3QVU-CKWL] (“Scalia said death penalty decisions from
the court have made it ‘practically impossible to impose it but we have not formally held
it to be unconstitutional.’ Earlier in his remarks, Scalia said ‘it wouldn’t surprise me if it
did’ fall, a comment that drew scattered applause in the mostly full, 2,700-seat auditorium.”).
16. See R.B. Bernstein, The Constitution as an Exploding Cigar and Other “Historian’s
Heresies” About a Constitutional Orthodoxy, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1073, 1078 (2011)
(“Justice Antonin Scalia, often cited as a leading originialist . . . call[ed] himself a ‘plainmeaning’ interpreter of the Constitution, focus[ed] on the plain meaning of the document
as of the time of its framing and ratification.”).
17. See Herrera, 506 U.S. at 429.
18. See The Code of Hammurabi, THE AVALON PROJECT (L.W. King trans.), http://avalon.
law.yale.edu/ancient/hamframe.asp [https://perma.cc/GBB7-YN9A] (last visited Feb. 16,
2017) (“If any one break a hole into a house (break in to steal), he shall be put to death
before that hole and be buried.”).
19. See Philip L. Barbour, Captain George Kendall: Mutineer or Intelligencer, 70 VA.
MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 297, 301 (1962).
20. See Introduction to the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.
deathpenaltyinfo.org/part-i-history-death-penalty [https://perma.cc/L2RK-VHBU] (last visited
Feb. 16, 2017).
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most minor offenses, such as killing chickens and trading with Indians.21
Colonial governments viewed public hangings as a good moral lesson for
the colonists—a reminder of social obedience and order.22
Penal laws varied from colony to colony.23 The Capital Laws of New
England permitted the death penalty for crimes such as murder, sodomy,
witchcraft, idolatry, blasphemy, rebellion, manslaughter, and poisoning.24
New York enacted the Duke’s Laws of 1665, which commanded capital
punishment for denial of the true God, pre-meditated murder, sodomy,
buggery, kidnapping, and other felonious offenses.25 On the other hand,
South Jersey had no mandated capital punishment and only permitted the
death penalty for murder and treason.26 By the time of Independence, all
of the colonies had similar death statutes covering arson, piracy, treason,
murder, sodomy, burglary, robbery, rape, horse-stealing, slave rebellion, and
counterfeiting.27
When the First Congress met in 1790, it enacted criminal statutes permitting
capital punishment for murder, forgery, robbery, and rape.28 Leading that
Congress were men who had drafted the Constitution and the Bill of Rights.
The Eighth Amendment to the Constitution, approved by that Congress
and ratified by the States in 1791, provided that “[e]xcessive bail shall not
be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted.”29 To an originalist like Justice Scalia, the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition against “cruel and unusual punishment” could not have been
intended to include the death penalty.30 The death penalty was so thoroughly
21. See David Konig, Dale’s Laws and the Non-Common Law Origins of Criminal
Justice in Virginia, 26 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 354, 354 (1982).
22. See JACK SHULER, THE THIRTEENTH TURN: A HISTORY OF THE NOOSE 60 (2014)
(“Colonists took executions seriously and believed there must be a pedagogical intent to
them.”).
23. See The Early Years of American Law - Colonial Freedom, Britain’s Push For
Greater Control, A New Start, A New Criminal Court System, JRANK, http://law.jrank.org/
pages/11900/Early-Years-American-Law.html [https://perma.cc/4FXF-PSK5] (last visited Feb.
16, 2017).
24. See JOHN COTTON, AN ABSTRACT OF THE LAWS OF NEW ENGLAND 12–14 (1641).
25. JAMES, DUKE OF YORK, DUKE’S LAWS (1665), http://www.worldcat.org/title/
dukes-laws-manuscript-1665/oclc/58771757 [https://perma.cc/DQP9-N834].
26. See Michael H. Reggio, History of the Death Penalty, in SOCIETY’S FINAL
SOLUTION: A HISTORY AND DISCUSSION OF THE DEATH PENALTY 1 (Laura E. Randa ed.,
1997).
27. See Philip English Mackey, Introduction to VOICES AGAINST DEATH: AMERICAN
OPPOSITION TO CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 1787–1976, at xvii (Philip English Mackey ed., 1976).
28. See Crimes Act, ch. 9, 1 Stat. 112 (1790); VALERIE HEITSHUSEN, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., RL30567, PARTY LEADERS IN THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS, 1789–2015, at 4, 16
(2015).
29. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
30. E.g., John F. Stinneford, Death, Desuetude, and Original Meaning, 56 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 531, 539–40 (2014).
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integrated with the penal system that had the Founders intended to include
the death penalty within the definition of “cruel and unusual punishment,”
he believed they would have done so explicitly.31 Even the Fifth Amendment
to the Constitution, also approved by the States in 1791, acknowledged
the right to indictment by Grand Jury in capital cases—reaffirming its
constitutionality through textual inclusion.32
That is not to suggest there was no abolitionist movement in the eighteenth
century. Cesare Beccaria’s 1764 essay, On Crimes and Punishment, argued
that a government could never justify taking a life.33 Beccaria’s arguments
led to the abolition of the death penalty in Austria and Tuscany and influenced
some of our Founding Fathers.34 Benjamin Rush, a signer of the Declaration
of Independence, challenged notions of the death penalty as a deterrent for
the commission of crimes.35 Thomas Jefferson attempted to reform Virginia’s
death penalty laws and proposed limiting its application to murder and
treason; however, Jefferson’s revisions to the penal code were defeated by
only one vote.36 In 1794, Pennsylvania repealed the death penalty except
in cases of first-degree murder.37
Though the Founders may not have intended to ban capital punishment,
they armed future jurists and litigants with tools to argue for and against
it. The Eighth Amendment prohibited sentencing defendants to cruel and
unusual punishments.38 The Fifth Amendment provided that “[n]o person . . .
shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.”39
31. See id. at 541.
32. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[No person shall] be deprived of life . . . without due process
of law . . . .”).
33. HERBERT H. HAINES, AGAINST CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE ANTI-DEATH PENALTY
MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1972–1994 at 7 (1996) (“[Abolitionists] drew their rhetorical
ammunition from European reformers like Cesare Beccaria, whose Essay on Crime and
Punishments was published in the United States in the 1770s and was frequently cited by
prison reformers and abolitionists”); see also CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS
(1764), http://www.constitution.org/cb/crim_pun28.txt [https://perma.cc/LJ35-W3QM].
34. John D. Bessler, Revisiting Beccaria’s Vision: The Enlightenment, America’s
Death Penalty, and the Abolition Movement, 4 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 195, 200–01 (2009).
35. See BENJAMIN RUSH, ON PUNISHING MURDER BY DEATH 1 (1793) (“The punishment
of murder by death, is contrary to reason, and to the order and happiness of society.”).
36. 2 THOMAS JEFFERSON, A Bill for Proportioning Crimes and Punishment, in THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 492, 494–95, 497 (Julian P. Boyd et al. eds., 1950); Early
Questions About the Death Penalty in Colonial America, THE DEATH PENALTY, http://death
penaltycurriculum.org/node/24 [https://perma.cc/B564-65JR] (last visited Feb. 17, 2016).
37. Mackey, supra note 27, at xvi.
38. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
39. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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Enacted in 1868, the Fourteenth Amendment parroted the language of the
Fifth and made the Eighth Amendment applicable to the States.40 The
drafters of these amendments did not view the amendments’ language to
prohibit the death penalty.41 Yet jurists, such as Justice Breyer, later used
the language to challenge the constitutional foundations of the death penalty.42
Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, opponents of
capital punishment achieved victories in some states.43 In 1847, Michigan
became the first state to abolish the death penalty for all crimes, except
treason.44 Similarly, Rhode Island, Maine, and Wisconsin later enacted
statutes prohibiting the death penalty in all cases, even in cases of treason.45
The rise of the Progressive Movement triggered another push to abolish
capital punishment—leading six states to outlaw the death penalty altogether,
and another three to limit it to cases of treason and first-degree murder.46
The death penalty resurged in the 1920s to the 1940s, however, with the 1930s
averaging 167 executions per year—the most executions of any period in
American history.47
Across the Atlantic, abolitionists had greater success. After the atrocities
of the Second World War, protection of human rights became a priority.
In 1948, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.48 Article 3 proclaimed the “right to life,”
noting no exceptions. Adopted in 1950, Article 2 of the European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights guarantees: “Everyone’s right to life
shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally
save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of
a crime for which this penalty is provided by law.”49 A de facto prohibition on

40. U.S. CONST. amend XIV.
41. See Stinneford, supra note 30.
42. See Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2755–56 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
43. See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, The American Death Penalty and the
(In)Visibility of Race, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 243, 249 (2015).
44. Michigan, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/michigan-0
[https://perma.cc/JP4C-QFFL] (last visited Feb. 16, 2017) (“Michigan became the first
English-speaking territory in the world to abolish capital punishment in 1847.”).
45. RAYMOND PATERNOSTER, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 9 (1991).
46. Part I: History of the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.
deathpenaltyinfo.org/part-i-history-death-penalty [https://perma.cc/GDY2-QWW5] (last visited
Feb. 16, 2017).
47. Id.
48. See G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, at 71 (Dec. 10,
1948).
49. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into protocol Mar. 20, 1950).

6

[VOL. 54: 1, 2017]

History and the Future of Capital Punishment
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

the death penalty became the norm in Europe.50 Today, capital punishment
has been abolished in every European country except Belarus.51
It took until the 1960s for death penalty abolitionists in the United States
to again garner meaningful support. In 1958, Chief Justice Earl Warren
wrote in a plurality decision in Trop v. Dulles that the Eighth Amendment
must draw its meaning from “the evolving standards of decency that mark
the progress of a maturing society.”52 If Europe was any indicator, whether
capital punishment met these standards was beginning to be questioned.
In 1963, advocates of abolition found an ally on the Supreme Court. Justice
Arthur Goldberg, appointed by President John F. Kennedy in 1962, became
the fifth vote in the Warren Court’s liberal majority.53 In 1963, Justice
Goldberg directed his law clerk to draft a memo with the most compelling
constitutional arguments against the death penalty.54 Justice Goldberg
circulated the memo to his fellow Justices condemning the death penalty
as a violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishment in light of evolving international standards.55
Later that year, the Supreme Court was presented with an opportunity
to review the constitutionality of the death penalty in Rudolph v. Alabama.56
The Court, however, denied certiorari.57 Writing a dissent from the denial
of cert, Justice Goldberg declared, “I would grant certiorari to consider
whether the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments permit the imposition of
the death penalty on a convicted rapist who has neither taken nor endangered
human life.”58 Justices William O. Douglas and William Brennan joined
Justice Goldberg’s dissent.59

50. See Abolition of the Death Penalty, COUNCIL OF EUR., http://www.coe.int/t/
dghl/standardsetting/hrpolicy/Others_issues/Death_Penalty/default_en.asp [https://perma.cc/
JEX6-MXVY] (last visited Feb. 16, 2017).
51. See id.
52. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
53. Arthur J. Goldberg, 1962-1965, THE SUPREME COURT HISTORICAL SOC’Y, http://
supremecourthistory.org/timeline_goldberg.html [https://perma.cc/ED3B-9QRZ] (last visited
Feb. 16, 2017).
54. Jesse Wegman, Editorial, The Death Memo, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2013), http://www.
nytimes.com/2013/08/25/opinion/sunday/the-death-memo.html [https://perma.cc/B93X-GV82].
55. EVAN J. MANDERY, A WILD JUSTICE 24 (2013).
56. Rudolph v. State, 152 So. 2d 662, 662 (Ala. 1963), cert. denied, Rudolph v. Alabama,
375 U.S. 889, 889 (1963).
57. Id.
58. Rudolph, 375 U.S. at 889 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
59. Id.
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Rudolph v. Alabama was a clear signal to criminal defense attorneys
that the Eighth Amendment must be asserted as a defense in capital cases.
Defense attorneys flooded appellate courts with petitions asking for
constitutional review of death penalty convictions of defendants on death
row.60 Administrative backlog virtually stopped executions in the United
States in the 1960s and early 1970s.61 Viewing its abolition as inevitable,
Vermont, Iowa, and West Virginia abolished the death penalty in those states.62
Justice Goldberg’s dissent reignited the war against America’s severest
sentence.
A chance to review the constitutionality of the death penalty reached
the Supreme Court in Furman v. Georgia.63 William Henry Furman,
a twenty-six-year-old African-American man, broke into a home in Georgia
intending to commit robbery. The home owner startled Furman. Furman
testified at trial that he dropped the gun while fleeing the scene of the crime,
the gun discharged, and killed the home owner. Contrary to Furman’s
testimony, the police report stated that Furman fired blindly in the
direction of the home owner while making his escape. Furman was
convicted of murder, and the jury sentenced him to death.64 Furman
appealed to the Supreme Court of Georgia, which affirmed Furman’s
conviction and the capital sentence.65
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, and consolidated it with two other
cases on appeal in Furman v Georgia.66 In Jackson v. Georgia, an AfricanAmerican man was convicted of rape in the process of committing armed
robbery.67 And Branch v. Texas, like Jackson v. Georgia, concerned an
African-American man’s conviction of rape.68 All three juries imposed the
death penalty without specific instructions or guidelines.
Furman v. Georgia presented the United States Supreme Court with the
issue of whether the death penalty constituted cruel and unusual punishment
in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. In a five-to-four
60. Arthur J. Goldberg, Death and the Supreme Court, 15 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
1, 2 (1987) (“[A]n important consequence [to Justice Goldberg’s dissent in Rudolph v.
Alabama] was to alert the Bar to challenge the constitutionality of capital sentencing
laws . . . .”).
61. Id. (“Thereafter, beginning in 1965, the constitutionality of the death penalty
was raised by counsel in a wide variety of cases. . . . This being the case, the Court, to consider
these challenges imposed a de facto moratorium on executions . . . .”).
62. LARRY W. KOCH ET AL., THE DEATH OF THE AMERICAN DEATH PENALTY: STATES
STILL LEADING THE WAY 13–14, 16 (2012).
63. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 238–40 (1972).
64. See id. at 252; Furman v. State, 167 S.E.2d, 628, 628–29 (Ga. 1969).
65. Furman, 167 S.E.2d at 628–629.
66. Furman v. Georgia, 403 U.S. 952 (1971).
67. See id.; Jackson v. State, 171 S.E.2d 501, 503 (Ga. 1969).
68. See Branch v. State, 447 S.W.2d 932, 932–33 (Tex. 1969).
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decision, the Supreme Court reversed the death sentences in all three cases.69
All nine Justices wrote separate opinions. Justices William O. Douglas,
Byron White, Potter Stewart, William Brennan, and Thurgood Marshall each
voted in favor of overturning the sentences. In a per curiam decision—no
Justice authored a majority opinion in the case— the Court held the “imposition
and carrying out of the death penalty in these cases constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
The judgment in each case is therefore reversed insofar as it leaves undisturbed
the death sentence imposed, and the cases are remanded for further
proceedings.”70 The majority, however, could not agree on the rationale
for its rather short holding.71
Three concurring Justices cited the arbitrariness of the capital punishment
in the statutes as the reason for their unconstitutionality. Justice William
O. Douglas argued that states disproportionately imposed the death penalty
on the poor and socially disadvantaged.72 Justice Douglas highlighted that
all three defendants in Furman were black and that the state statutes left
the decision to impose the death penalty to the jury with no guiding principles.73
Black defendants in predominantly white states would be disadvantaged
due to cultural prejudices that persisted.74 According to Justice Douglas,
discretionary statutes that allow for the imposition of the death penalty in
a discriminatory manner cannot be compatible with due process guarantees.75
Justice White began his concurrence by hedging, “I do not at all intimate
that the death penalty is unconstitutional per se or that there is no system
of capital punishment that would comport with the Eighth Amendment.”76
Justice White doubted the death penalty acted as an effective deterrent given
its infrequent imposition.77 In many other cases with similar or worse
facts than the defendants’ cases, juries imposed life imprisonment or shorter

69. Furman, 408 U.S. at 239–40.
70. Id. at 238–40 (emphasis added).
71. See id.
72. See id. at 242 (Douglas, J., concurring) (“It would seem to be incontestable that
the death penalty inflicted on one defendant is ‘unusual’ if it discriminates against him by
reason of his race, religion, wealth, social position, or class, of if it is imposed under a
procedure that gives room for the play of such prejudices.”).
73. Id. at 240, 252–53.
74. Id. at 252–53.
75. See id. at 257.
76. Id. at 310–11 (White, J., concurring).
77. See id.

9

prison terms upon finding that these punishments were sufficient.78 Under
the current statutory regimes in the cases before the Court, without more
frequent imposition and stricter guidelines, juries lacked meaningful bases
for distinguishing between cases that warranted the death penalty and
those that did not.79 Justice White concluded that the jury’s ability to reject
the death penalty, no matter the facts and circumstances, rendered an arbitrary
form of punishment.80
Justice Stewart also refused to reach the constitutionality of the death
penalty as a whole. Justice Stewart echoed Justice White’s concerns,
calling the Georgia and Texas death penalty statutes “unusual in the sense
that the penalty of death is infrequently imposed for murder, and that its
imposition for rape is extraordinarily rare.”81 He concluded that “these
death sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by
lightning is cruel and unusual,” and that the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments “cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death under
legal systems that permit this unique penalty to be so wantonly and
so freakishly imposed.”82
Justices White and Stewart agreed that the death penalty, as applied in
these cases, violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments but each
believed that a statutory regime with clear guidelines would make capital
punishment constitutional.83 Justices Brennan and Marshall reached the
ultimate question, each concluding that the death penalty per se violated the
Eighth Amendment.84
Justice Brennan, citing Trop, repudiated the idea that the Framers’ intent
could control in a case implicating the cruel and unusual punishments
clause.85 According to Justice Brennan, the Eighth Amendment prohibits:
(1) the infliction of uncivilized and inhuman punishments that degrade the
dignity of human beings, (2) the arbitrary infliction of severe punishment,
(3) punishment unacceptable to contemporary society, and (4) excessive
punishment when a less severe punishment is adequate.86 Justice Brennan
proceeded to analyze the death penalty under these four principles.87
First, the death penalty degrades human dignity in an ultimate way—by
denying the executed person’s right to life and humanity. This alone, Justice
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
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See id.
Id. at 310–11.
Id. at 313–14.
Id. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring).
Id. at 309–10.
Id. at 306–10 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 310–14 (White, J., concurring).
See id. at 305–06 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 358–59 (Marshall, J., concurring).
Id. at 258 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 89 (1958)).
Id. at 270–71, 274, 277, 279.
Id. at 270.
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Brennan suggested, would be enough to hold the death penalty unconstitutional
under the Eighth Amendment. Second, the death penalty is infrequently
imposed despite thousands of crimes each year eligible for capital sentencing.
Nothing distinguished the crimes of Furman from other murders; if his
crime was “extreme,” then nearly all murderers and theirs murders are also
“extreme.”88 The “procedures are not constructed to guard against the totally
capricious selection of criminals for the punishment of death.”89 Third,
the death penalty has historically stirred public controversy and over time the
public has sought to comport punishments with human dignity. The history
of the death penalty has been one of successive restriction. According to
Justice Brennan, “when an unusually severe punishment is authorized for
wide-scale application but not, because of society’s refusal, inflicted save
in a few instances, the inference is compelling that there is a deep-seated
reluctance to inflict it.”90 Finally, in order for the death penalty to be necessary
for deterrence purposes there must exist a potential, rational criminal “who
will commit a capital crime knowing that the punishment is long-term
imprisonment . . . but will not commit the crime knowing that the punishment
is death.”91 The risk of imposition of the death penalty, however, is too
remote and improbable to act as an effective deterrent. Life imprisonment
equally deters and protects society from dangerous criminals.
Justice Marshall’s concurrence raised many of the same concerns about
human decency as Justice Brennan. Justice Marshall focused on the “evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”92
Concluding his concurrence, Marshall stated:
In striking down capital punishment, this Court does not malign our system
of government. On the contrary, it pays homage to it. Only in a free society could
right triumph in difficult times, and could civilization record its magnificent
advancement. In recognizing the humanity of our fellow beings, we pay ourselves
the highest tribute. We achieve ‘a major milestone in the long road up from
barbarism’ and join the approximately 70 other jurisdictions in the world which
celebrate their regard for civilization and humanity by shunning capital punishment.93

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
(1958)).
93.

Id. at 293–94.
Id. at 295.
Id. at 300.
Id. at 301.
Id. at 329 (Marshall, J., concurring) (quoting Trops v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101
Id. at 371 (quoting RAMSEY CLARK, CRIME IN AMERICA 336 (1970)).
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Chief Justice Warren Burger and Justices Harry Blackmun, Lewis Powell,
and William Rehnquist dissented.94 Though each wrote separately, the
dissenters each raised similar concerns. Until Furman, capital punishment
was presumed constitutional in light of its prevalence and history.95 In
deciding Furman, the majority ignored years of Supreme Court precedent.96
In addition, the dissent expressed concerns that the Supreme Court should
not challenge state legislative judgments about the death penalty’s desirability
or effectiveness.97 The legislature—not the Court—represents the will of
the people and responds best to the will and moral values of the people.98
Furthermore, the death penalty enjoys popular support in the United States
among much of the population.99
Among the dissents, Justice Blackmun’s deserves further comment.
Justice Blackmun expressed that if he were a legislator he would vote
against the death penalty for policy reasons.100 While Justice Blackmun
admitted his own internal conflict over the death penalty, he was disturbed
by the “suddenness of the Court’s perception of progress in the human
attitude since decisions of only a short while ago.”101 He concluded,
“Although personally I may rejoice at the Court’s result, I find it difficult
to accept or to justify as a matter of history, of law, or of constitutional
pronouncement. I fear the Court has overstepped.”102 Thus, his dissent
acknowledged the moral conundrum raised by the death penalty. However,
in the eyes of the dissenting Justices, its permissibility was a policy decision
best left to state legislators.
Furman was a shock to the capital punishment system in the United
States, invalidating death penalty statutes in approximately forty states and
overturning 600 death penalty sentences.103 The Court’s decision forced
state legislatures to consider whether the death penalty still served a role
in the penal system. Instead of abandoning capital punishment, thirty-four
states enacted new death penalty statutes to comport with the Court’s
holdings.104 Some states enacted statutes bifurcating trials and providing
juries with guidelines for imposing the death penalties.105 Other states
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

See id. at 375–470 (dissenting opinions).
Id. at 451 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
See id.
Id. at 405 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
Id.
See id. at 443 (Powell, J., dissenting); id. at 465 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Id. at 406 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
See id. at 410.
Id. at 414.
See MARK COSTANZO, JUST REVENGE: COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEATH
PENALTY 19 (1997); Part I: History of the Death Penalty, supra note 46.
104. Part I: History of the Death Penalty, supra note 46.
105. Id.
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mandated the death penalty upon conviction for certain crimes.106 A referendum
in California overturned the California Supreme Court’s decision in California
v. Anderson, which held the death penalty violated the California
constitution.107
If popular opinion dictated the evolving standards of decency in society,
the majority of the U.S. population reaffirmed capital punishment as an
appropriate sentence in some cases. The voters in California had another
opportunity to vote for or against the death penalty on two referenda in
November 2016, and they reached the same result as they did over forty
years ago.108 Proposition 62, which was defeated, would have repealed
capital punishment and made life without parole the maximum punishment
for murder in California.109 Proposition 66, which was approved, retains
the death penalty and speeds up the appellate process prior to executions.110
In December 2016, the California Supreme Court stayed the implementation
of Proposition 66 to consider a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality
of the measure.111
The Supreme Court’s de facto moratorium on the death penalty in the
United States came to an end in 1976 with the Court’s decision in Gregg
v. Georgia.112 On November 21, 1973, Troy Gregg robbed and murdered
Fred Simmons and Bob Moore after they picked him up while he was
hitchhiking.113 At trial, the judge recommended either the death sentence
or life imprisonment.114 Georgia’s revised death penalty statute used a
106.
107.

Id.
CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN THE STATES: CONTEMPORARY CONTROVERSIES AND
HISTORICAL PATTERNS 157 (G. Alan Tarr ed., Greenwood Press 1996).
108. Despite Californians’ Overall Move to the Left, Death Penalty Remained a Holdout,
S. CAL. PUB. RADIO (Nov. 10, 2016), http://www.scpr.org/programs/airtalk/2016/11/10/
53016/ca-voters-on-the-death-penalty [https://perma.cc/V32F-9HDF].
109. California Proposition 62, Repeal of the Death Penalty (2016), BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/California_Proposition_62,_Repeal_of_the_Death_Penalty_(2016)
[https://perma.cc/HS5K-4ZCV] (last visited Feb. 16, 2017).
110.
California Proposition 66, Death Penalty Procedures (2016), BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/California_Proposition_66,_Death_Penalty_Procedures_(2016)
[https://perma.cc/458R-DAPC] (last visited Feb. 16, 2017); SEC’Y OF STATE OF THE STATE
OF CAL., OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE 78–81, 104–107 (2016) (explaining the
views of the advocates and opponents of California’s Proposition 62 and Proposition 66).
111. California Supreme Court Halts Death Penalty Measure Prop 66, S. CAL. PUB.
RADIO (Dec. 20, 2016), http://www.scpr.org/news/2016/12/20/67381/california-supremecourt-halts-death-penalty-measu [https://perma.cc/5MZ7-5ERS].
112. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 207 (1976).
113. Id. at 158–59.
114. Id. at 160.
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bifurcated procedure.115 In instructing the jury on the death penalty
hearing, the trial court judge required the jury to find beyond a reasonable
doubt that (1) the offense of murder was committed while the offender
was engaged in the commission of two other capital felonies; (2) the
offender committed the offense of murder for purpose of receiving money
and the automobile described in the incident; and (3) the offense of murder
was outrageously and wantonly vile, horrible, and inhuman, in that it
involved the depravity of the mind of the defendant.116 Finding these three
requirements met, the jury imposed the death sentence for Gregg on the
murder charge and on the armed robbery conviction.117 The Georgia Supreme
Court affirmed the capital punishment sentence for the murder conviction,
but vacated the capital punishment sentence for the armed robbery conviction.118
On appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, Gregg was combined with four other
similar cases involving sentences of capital punishment from Florida, Texas,
North Carolina, and Louisiana.119 Gregg afforded the Court the opportunity
to review the revised statutes drafted post-Furman.
With one exception, the same Justices that decided Furman also decided
Gregg. In 1974, Justice Douglas suffered a debilitating stroke that left
him partially paralyzed.120 Despite his insistence that he continue to serve
on the Court, the other Justices convinced Douglas to retire.121 In his place,
President Ford appointed Justice John Paul Stevens.122 Justice Douglas—
discontent with his retirement—insisted that he had only taken senior status
on the Court.123 When he tried to hear arguments in Gregg, the other nine
Justices delivered Douglas a formal letter informing him that his retirement
had ended his duties on the Court.124
In Gregg, the Supreme Court held, by a plurality of 7–2, that the Georgia
statute did not violate the Constitution because it provides objective criteria
directing and limiting discretion and permits the sentencing authority to
consider the defendant’s character.125 The Court also held the Florida and

115. See id. at 158.
116. Id. at 161.
117. See id. at 161.
118. Gregg. v. State, 210 S.E.2d 659, 667 (Ga. 1974).
119. Gregg v. Georgia, 423 U.S. 1082, 1082–83 (1976).
120. THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 272
(Kermit L. Hall ed., 2d ed., 2005).
121. ARTEMUS WARD, DECIDING TO LEAVE: THE POLITICS OF RETIREMENT FROM THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 191 (2003).
122. Id.
123. See id.
124. Id.
125. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 206–07.
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Texas statutes constitutional but ruled the North Carolina and Louisiana
statutes unconstitutional.126
In a plurality decision by Justice Stewart joined by Justices Powell and
Stevens, the Court held that the death penalty is not per se cruel and
unusual punishment.127 Rather, the death penalty may be constitutionally
imposed when it is proportional to the severity of the crime, not arbitrarily
imposed, and does not result in a wanton infliction of pain.128 Gregg
clarified the holding of Furman to effectuate Furman’s demand that the
sentencing authority have discretion in deciding whether or not to impose
the death penalty.129 The Court created a two-part standard for legislatures
in enacting constitutional capital punishment schemes.130 First, the statute
must provide objective criteria to limit discretion.131 Second, the sentencer
must be allowed to take into account the character and past conduct of the
defendant.132 Applying this standard, the Court found the bifurcated trial
under the Georgia statute prevented arbitrary and disproportionate death
sentences.133 While the plurality did not hold as such, it strongly implied
that mandatory death penalty statutes would violate the Eighth Amendment.134
Justice White, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist,
concurred.135 Justice White dwelled on the death penalty’s history and
presence in the U.S. Constitution, concluding it could never be per se
unconstitutional.136 Moreover, the majority of states enacted new death
penalty statutes after Furman, reaffirming its popular support within the
United States.137 Justice White reaffirmed that prosecutorial discretion in
charging does not make capital punishment unconstitutionally arbitrary.138

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id.; Part I: History of the Death Penalty, supra note 46.
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 206.
See id. at 203–04.
See id. at 206–07.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 207 (White, J., concurring).
See id. at 226.
Part I: History of the Death Penalty, supra note 46.
See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 225 (White, J., concurring).
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The prosecutor decides whether to seek the death penalty on the likelihood
of success.139
Again, Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented. Both argued that the
death penalty was unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment.140 Justice
Brennan reaffirmed that “[t]he Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause
‘must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark
the progress of a maturing society.’”141 Justice Marshall again criticized the
death penalty as “morally unacceptable.”142
Gregg revived the death penalty and ended Furman’s de facto moratorium.
In 1977, Utah became the first state to resume executions.143 The reinstatement
of the death penalty renewed public outcry against capital punishment.
Many institutions and scholars published reports condemning the Court’s
decision. In 1980, the Judicial Affairs Committee of the American Medical
Association passed a resolution stating that physicians should not participate
in executions.144 A 1987 study by Hugo Bedau and Michael Radelet in the
Stanford Law Review prompted further outrage by documenting 350 cases
of wrongly convicted defendants in capital punishment cases from 1900
to 1985.145
Bedau and Radelet’s study started a movement for increased use of DNA
evidence in capital punishment cases. In 1993, Kirk Bloodsworth became
the first inmate on death row to be exonerated with DNA testing.146 In
1997, the American Bar Association adopted a resolution calling for a
moratorium on capital punishment to (1) ensure that death penalty cases
are administered fairly and impartially and (2) minimize the risk that innocent
persons may be executed.147 Throughout the last three decades, states such
139. See id. (“Absent facts to the contrary, it cannot be assumed that prosecutors will
be motived in their charging decision by factors other than the strength of their case and
the likelihood that a jury would impose the death penalty if it convicts.”).
140. Id. at 227 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 232 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
141. Id. at 227 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
142. Id. at 232 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
143. COSTANZO, supra note 103, at 22.
144. PROCEEDINGS OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, ANNUAL CONVENTION, AM. MED.
ASS’N 85–86 (1980), http://ama.nmtvault.com/jsp/viewer.jsp?doc_id=ama_arch%2FHOD00
001%2F00000110&query1=&recoffset=0&collection_filter=Transactions&collection_n
ame=1ee24daa-2768-4bff-b792-e4859988fe94&sort_col=&CurSearchNum=-1 [https://
perma.cc/WCQ7-XLWT].
145. See Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of Justices in Potentially
Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21, 23–24 (1987).
146. Margot Alder, Once on Death Row, He Now Fights to Defeat the Death Penalty,
NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Mar. 10, 2013, 4:07 PM), http://www.npr.org/2013/03/10/173852138/
once-on-death-row-he-now-fights-to-defeat-the-death-penalty [https://perma.cc/E89R-2EHH].
147. See Death Penalty Moratorium Resolution (1997), AM. BAR ASS’N, http://www.
americanbar.org/groups/committees/death_penalty_representation/resources/dp-policy/
moratorium-1997.html [https://perma.cc/N5CZ-5DJK] (last visited Feb. 16, 2017).
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as New York, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Nebraska, Connecticut, and Illinois
have either eliminated the death penalty or instituted a moratorium on
executions.148
Since Gregg, the Court requires heightened statutory procedures for states
wishing to impose the death penalty. In 1978, in Lockett v. Ohio, the Court
expanded Gregg’s holding requiring the sentencer to consider all possible
mitigating factors.149 The Court in Lockett held that the legislature cannot
restrict which mitigating factors the sentencer considers.150 Rather, the
sentencer must be allowed to consider every possible mitigating factor
presented by the defendant.151 Two years later, in Beck v. Alabama, the Court
held that juries must be allowed to consider lesser offenses, not just the
capital offense or acquittal.152
Yet in other cases, the Court allowed more liberal application of capital
punishment. In 1984, in Spaziano v. Florida, the Court held that a judge may
constitutionally override a jury’s recommendation of life imprisonment
and impose the death penalty.153 In 2002, however, the Court essentially
overruled Spaziano in Ring v. Arizona.154 In 2016, in Hurst v. Florida,
the Court held that the jury, not the judge, must make the findings necessary
to impose the death penalty, removing the capital punishment sentencing
decision from judges’ hands.155
In addition to these procedural restrictions, the Court has found the death
penalty excessive when applied in a number of particular cases. One year
after Gregg, the Court held in Coker v. Georgia that the death penalty
is unconstitutional when imposed for rape of an adult woman when the
victim is not killed.156 Justice White, writing for the plurality, held that
death is excessive punishment for “the rapist who, as such, does not take
human life.”157 The Court has since limited capital punishment’s application
to specific crimes.

148. States with and Without the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty [https://perma.cc/MY7TR9X2] (last visited Feb. 16, 2017).
149. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978).
150. See id. at 605–08.
151. See id. at 605.
152. See Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 642–43 (1980).
153. See Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 462–63 (1984).
154. See generally Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
155. See Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 625 (2016).
156. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 599 (1977).
157. Id. at 598.
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In other cases, the Court has prohibited the imposition of capital punishment
for certain defendants. In Ford v. Wainwright, the Court held that the
Eighth Amendment prohibited the execution of insane persons, because
executing the insane did not serve any penological goals.158 Similarly, in
Atkins v. Virginia, the Court held that executing individuals with intellectual
disabilities violates the Eighth Amendment.159 As mentally disabled
individuals cannot communicate with the same sophistication as the average
offender, there is a greater likelihood that their deficiency in communication
would be interpreted by juries as a lack of remorse for their crimes.160 In
Roper v. Simmons, the Court held that it was unconstitutional to impose
the death penalty for crimes committed while the defendant was under the
age of eighteen.161 According to Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion, only
three states had executed prisoners under the age of eighteen since 1995.162
Kennedy also cited international standards, finding that only seven other
countries execute juvenile offenders.163
As the Supreme Court has continued to further restrict the death penalty,
more Justices have joined Justices Brennan and Marshall in finding that
the Eighth Amendment prohibits capital punishment. Dissenting in Callins
v. Collins in 1994, his last year on the Court, Justice Blackmun famously
wrote, “[F]rom this day forward, I shall no longer tinker with the machinery
of death.”164 In his recent book, Six Amendments: How and Why We Should
Change the Constitution, Justice Stevens said, “For me, the question that
cannot be avoided is whether the execution of only an ‘insignificant minimum’
of innocent citizens is tolerable in a civilized society . . . . When it comes
to state-mandated killings of innocent civilians, there can be no ‘insignificant
minimum.’”165
Last year, in a concurring opinion in Glossip v. Gross, Justice Breyer, joined
by Justice Ginsburg, wrote:
Nearly 40 years ago [referring to Gregg], this Court upheld the death penalty
under statutes that, in the Court’s view, contained safeguards sufficient to ensure
that the penalty would be applied reliably and not arbitrarily. The circumstances
and the evidence of the death penalty’s application have changed radically since
then. Those changes, taken together with my own 20 years of experience on this

158. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409–10 (1986).
159. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
160. Id. at 320–21.
161. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).
162. Id. at 564–65.
163. Id. at 577.
164. See Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
165. JOHN PAUL STEVENS, SIX AMENDMENTS: HOW AND WHY WE SHOULD CHANGE
THE CONSTITUTION 122 (2014).
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Court, lead me to believe that the death penalty, in and of itself, now likely constitutes
a legally prohibited ‘cruel and unusual punishment.’166

Over the last fifty years, we have seen a movement toward restricting
capital punishment in the United States. Today, nineteen states and the District
of Columbia have abolished the death penalty.167 The Supreme Court and
its Justices have continued to profess wariness about its constitutionality
under the Eighth Amendment.168 Justice Scalia’s prophecy that the Court
may hold capital punishment to be unconstitutional in the near future
seems very likely. Two Justices—Justice Steven Breyer and Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg—have signaled their support for reconsideration of the
constitutionality of capital punishment.169 No other current Justice has
endorsed that view.170 Two other current Justices in the liberal wing of
the Court—Justice Sonia Sotomayor and Justice Elena Kagan—have not
indicated a position on the issue, but might be supportive.171 Justice Anthony
Kennedy has written opinions narrowing the cases in which the death
penalty can be applied.172 Although a majority of the current Court might
hold the death penalty unconstitutional, the presidential election in 2016
may have changed the timetable for such a decision. President Donald Trump’s
election and his appointment of Justice Neil Gorsuch increases the number of
conservative Justices on the Court.
It is possible, but not likely, that the Court may consider the constitutionality
of the death penalty in two cases on the docket in the current term of the
Court.173 Both cases are on appeal from defendants on death row in

166. See Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2755–56 (2015) (Brennan, J., concurring).
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Texas.174 In these cases, the Court will consider the role of race and intellectual
disability in capital prosecutions. In one case, the Court will consider the
effect of a psychologist’s testimony as a witness for a black defendant that
black defendants are more dangerous to society than white defendants.175
The other case involves the appropriate standard for determining whether
a defendant has a mental disability that would preclude execution for his
crime.176 Initially, when the Court announced that it would hear the second
case, the Order said the Justices would also consider a second question—
whether executing a convicted defendant more than thirty-five years after
he was sentenced to death violates the Eighth Amendment.177 Two hours
after that announcement, the Court issued a revised Order limiting the case
to the intellectual disability issue.178 Apparently, the Court wanted to ensure
that a full complement of nine Justices hear a case in which it considers
whether capital punishment violates the Eighth Amendment.
It appears the issue of the constitutionality of the death penalty will await
another case, and the wait may be a little longer than expected only a year
ago. In view of the trend of Supreme Court cases in recent years, however,
I expect that Justice Scalia’s prediction will come true, and it will happen
during the terms of some of the Justices currently on the Court.

174. Id.
175. Buck v. Stephens, 623 Fed. App’x. 668 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 136 S.
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(U.S. July 28, 2016).
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v. Texas, No. 15-797 (U.S. July 28, 2016).
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